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HARMONY, LAW, AND ANTHROPOLOGY
Daniel H. Levine*

HARMONY ,IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE. By Laura Nader. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1990. Pp. xxiii, 343. $37.50.
Harmony Ideology presents a retrospective look at how law and its
varied social and cultural uses emerge, take on particular form and
social significance, and change. The setting is Talea de Castro, a
Zapotec town in Southern Mexico, whose legal arrangements as captured by Laura Nader teeter between autonomy and subordination,
traditional usages and a host of changes about to hit home. Nader sets
the town, along with its people, identities, and institutions, in a larger
comparative and theoretical context that provides perspectives for understanding dispute resolution, local autonomy, and ideology.
Nader's basic thesis is that the way villagers see the law and use
the courts for specific disputes makes sense in a context in which it is
important that disputes are contained within the town, not appealed to
or assumed by the larger state apparatus. Confining the dispute and
its resolution within the town ensures the survival of village autonomy
and of the local culture associated with it. Nader focuses upon the
ideal of harmony, which is the goal of dispute resolution. She argues
that the spread of ideas about harmony is part of the heritage of Christian missionary activity in the modem world (pp. xix, 1-2, 292, 296304). Harmony as manifest in legal norms, structures, and routines
thus acquires cultural sense as part of its long-term relation with
power and domination. Full understanding requires a full historical
dimension: how things came to be is part of how and why they work
the way they do.
Law has two faces: dispute and litigation are accepted parts of
normal life within the village; harmony and unity are presented to the
outside. Strenuous efforts are made to contain disputes within the
town, and to resolve them in ways that plaintiffs, defendants, and residents in general will accept as fair and sensible (pp. 8, 123, 133-61,
317-18). Court sessions often have a therapeutic tone here. Judges
work to bind all sides to settlements and in this way maintain local
* Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan. A.B. 1964, Dartmouth College;
M.S. (Economics) 1965, London School of Economics; M.Phil. (Political Science) 1967, Yale;
Ph.D. (Political Science) 1970, Yale. - Ed. Professor Levine is the author of numerous articles
and books on Latin America. He is the author of a forthcoming book entitled Popular Voices in
Latin American Catholicism.
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relationships and avoid escalations that take things out of local hands.
Individual beliefs about the law and how to use it therefore have social
consequences and face limits set by existing social arrangements.
From the point of view of local law, compromise is the politics of adjustment. But more important, compromise becomes a politics of survival
when indigenous communities try to restore a lost social solidarity as
they learn to cope with threats from more powerful societies. Community courts become the places where people engage in discourses that
establish and reinforce common beliefs and values and that are conscious
political strategies . . . . Groups that support a harmony ideology often
share the belief that the forces of disorder lie outside their group. [p.
298]

Harmony Ideology is best understood as a retrospective study of
prior research, with the strengths and weaknesses of the genre. Most
notable among its strengths is the author's synthesis of more than
three decades of research on these and related issues in southern Mexico. Nader paints a rich and in many ways compelling portrait of how
laws, legal issues, and courts appear to most residents. Extensive
court transcripts provide fascinating insight into the day-to-day experience oflaw. We learn a great deal about who goes to law, how, and
to what ends. Local styles of dispute resolution look very informal to
American eyes, with emphasis placed more on reconciliation than
factfinding, and more on accommodation of interests and maintenance
or restoration of relationships than adjudication.
But the book has important weaknesses. To begin with, the data
are old. The general ethnographic information, case transcripts, reviews of court dockets, and interviews date from the late 1950s and
early 1960s. They appear to have been gathered just at the time the
long-standing legal arrangements and the isolation on which they were
premised were coming apart. Roads were being built, new economic
connections forged, and "outsiders" starting to arrive. 1 The passage of
time need not be crippling: by itself age does not invalidate data of the
kind Nader presents. But the problem is deeper; for as we shall see,
important theoretical debates have substantially changed the anthropological perspectives upon which the data Nader uses were premised.
Nader is frank about the existence of these debates, and provides an
extensive review of shifts in the anthropology of law (pp. 292-322).
Indeed, the author appears so sensitive to changing currents within
her discipline that she occasionally presents the reader with incongruous collections of theoretical and methodological opposites. The result is more confusion than clarification. Thus:
This book has been written over many years, and for that reason has
been a pleasure intellectually. I have not been in a hurry to produce a
1. Nader's brief historical overview in the preface, introduction, and Chapter Two (''The
Experience of Place") provides scattered evidence on this point. See also her co=ents on shifting patterns of social organization. Pp. 45-51.
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work that fits into the latest mood in anthropology. Rather, I have been
able to incorporate the wealth of insight that has come from each successive contribution: the structural-functionalists, the interest in process
and power, a reflective style that has forced a consideration of paradigm
and the place of a critical anthropology, the world-system theories, and
the insight that comes from understanding cultural as well as social control. Anthropology, of all disciplines, should not be hampered by
schools of thought or by subdivisions .... In the 1990's a composite
approach, rather than attachment to any particular school of social or
cultural theory, will add to the power of anthropological analysis of the
microcosm in a global system. [p. xxiii]

It is at best problematic, at worst impossible, to use research
guided by one set of theories, assumptions, and methods to support
conclusions that rest on very different intellectual foundations. The
problem is compounded by Nader's tendency to juxtapose old data
and new perspectives rather than to confront or integrate the disparities. The result is a sandwich: dense description and analysis of a
particular case surrounded by theoretical and comparative reflections,
and no obvious or explicit link between the two.
After a brief preface and introduction, Harmony Ideology is organized into four parts. Part I, entitled "Social Organization and Control," comprises three chapters of background information on the
town. Much of this is standard ethnographic information such as climate, topography, agriculture, and food. But in connection with the
author's analysis of social structure and institutional patterns, this
opening discussion provides a sense of place that sets later chapters on
courts and court users in a meaningful context.
Social order has been maintained by ensuring that citizens are members
of a variety of organizations and that they share the idea of ciudadano,
or citizen participation in the functioning of the town, the idea of rinconero - a people psychologically isolated from the outside - and the
idea of harmony as expressed in organizations that prevent escalation of
disputes. [p. 51]

The core of the book lies in Parts II ("Court Users") and III ("The
Substance of Legal Encounters"), which together contain nine of fifteen chapters and over 200 of 343 pages. In five chapters on court
users, Nader shows how Taleans initiate and decide litigation, details
prevailing standards for a good settlement, and sheds light on the role
of judges and on differences among courts. She substantiates her thesis that harmony and settling are vital to Taleans, who hold agreement
not only as an implicit cultural value, but also as an explicit goal and
norm. For Taleans, "[a] bad agreement is better than a good fight" (p.
87), and disputes are framed in light of overriding commitments to
finding balance. In Part III, the author examines "the substance of
legal encounters" by analyzing case material and a limited sample of
court dockets in terms of variables such as gender, family structure,
violence, property, and authority.
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Nader lays out general and comparative arguments in Part IV on
"Connections." The penultimate chapter examines "Harmony in
Comparative Perspective" through a review of recent anthropological
research and debates. The concluding chapter addresses "Ethnography and the Construction of Theory" and, in line with current fashion,
is taken by the author as a chance for self-reflection.

I. HARMONY, CONFLICT, AND THE COURTS
Harmony figures in Nader's analysis in three related ways. First,
harmony operates as a set of implicit norms, a practical code orienting
residents to law and its uses. This is vital because the pattern of dispute resolution is user initiated: people come to the law; with rare
exceptions, the law does not reach out in their name. Harmony is also
manifest as an explicit ideology, a set of consciously held rules governing the role of judges and other officials and the way they approach
disputes, settlements, punishments, and authority in general. Finally,
in the most general terms, harmony appears as a central part of colonialism's cultural and institutional heritage, the most enduring residue
of Christian missionizing.
Three assumptions undergird the whole analysis. The first concerns the compatibility of harmony with conflict. At one time this was
something of a heresy in anthropology, when the myth of the harmonious community prevailed. Gluckman, Coser, Dahrendorf, and
others exploded that myth some time ago by showing that processes
legitimating conflict support cohesion.2 The challenge is not to eliminate conflict, but to build it into regular, containable channels. A second assumption is that the effort to present themselves to the outside
world as a bounded and united community "has served the Zapotec
well. It has produced in Talea a social organization in which order is
not solely law nor even solely a result of law and the enforcement of
law" (p. 310). In Nader's view, then, for the Zapotec of Talea de Castro, law is more than just a set of practical arrangements for raising
and settling disputes. Because of its connections to personal and community identity, the theory and practice of law illuminates both local
culture and what Ortner refers to as "operators in the social process,
things that when put together in certain arrangements in certain contexts ... produce essentially social transformations." 3
The final assumption, apparent especially in the book's concluding
chapters, is that all this has meaning not only for the observed, but
also for the observer. Nader underscores the reflexive quality of
2. E.g., L. CosER, THE FuNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CoNFLICT (1956); R. DAHRENDORF, Cl.Ass
AND CLASS CoNFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1955); M. GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1959).
'

3. Ortner, Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties, 26 CoMP. STUD. Socv. & HIST. 131
(1984).
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knowledge about harmony and law, manifest in sensitivity to the
Western history of conquest and in awareness of how much assumptions about harmony pervade our own culture.
The example of the Talean Zapotec is suggestive of a theory of cultural
control that merges harmony and conflict as part of the same control
system. Harmony and conflict are not antithetical, as previous theories
have suggested. We Westerners may have difficulty grasping the idea of
an ideology that values harmony or controversy neutrally unless we understand that any morality regarding harmony and conflict is as contrived as the construction of a social organization that mirrors either
ideology. Those of us who attend Christian churches in the United
States can attest that Sunday sermons are still filled with the rhetoric of
harmony ideology. One characteristic feature of disputing processes and
their basis in morality is their attractiveness as forums for an ideological
marketplace. [pp. 307-08]

As a working code, ideas about harmony legitimize the system and
its results in several reinforcing ways. User initiation of disputes keeps
the substance of litigation close to the concerns of daily life and ordinary people. Plaintiffs, defendants, and judges all know one another,
and a large majority of cases arises within continuing relationships like
marriages, contracts, or arrangements for the use of property. This
buttresses social pressures to reach and accept agreements, and undergirds the common faith that a "bad agreement is better than a good
fight."
Different categories of people use the courts in predictable ways.
Men are more likely to be accused of violent physical aggression, commonly arising out of drunkenness in public places. Women appear as
victims of violence, are accused of verbal aggression (gossip), and raise
most suits concerning the family, charging abandonment or adultery,
for example (pp. 192-213). They are occasionally charged with seeking abortion, regarded here as a serious crime (pp. 213-16). Men are
more likely to appear as defendants, women to be aided or represented
by male relations, such as brothers or fathers (pp. 139-40). Nader argues that such variation is less significant than the fact that, together,
the uses and users of the court system are broadly representative of the
community (pp. 158-61). In her view, this ensures legitimacy, while
making it likely that the system as a whole will end up more democratic than authoritarian. She states that decisions by the court
are not judicial decisions, strictly speaking. They result from the interaction between the parties and the official in the context of wider societal
values. This point is worth reiterating because behavioral scientists are
accustomed to thinking about decision-making from a top-down vantage
point - as if it were something judges do for court participants. In this
context, the official may play a relatively passive role or an active role, a
court may simultaneously appear democratic or authoritarian depending
on one's perspective. From an individualistic vantage point, the courts
appear authoritarian because of the intrusive and penal character of
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many outcomes and because of court regulation of personal conduct
such as drunkenness. But if one's perspective is based in community
autonomy and the court is seen as an agency responsible for maintaining
community harmony, then the courts appear to fit a more democratic
model. [p. 158]

For the record, the most common cause of complaint concerns
property (control of land or water, inheritance, and division of crops)
(p. 147-48). Family matters and physical and verbal violence follow
(p. 149). Almost all cases go against the defendant (pp. 154-55), with
punishments ranging from fines (which are paid to the local treasury)
or restitution to stem injunctions to patch things up. 4 Nader attributes this settlement pattern to the informal character of court procedures and evidence, and to the local legal culture that places "making
a balance" and achieving reconciliation over placing blame (pp. 123,
154-58, 219-21). In contrast to Western procedures, premised on narrowing the focus in order to make decisions more precise, Taleans regularly broaden the process in order to draw parties to a solution.
Talean court style resembles a type of procedure that is situationally determined. Although in the West this type of justice system has usually
been described in derogatory terms and wide discretion may be seen as
unfair because of the absence of universal standards, many societies hold
another view. The Taleans use a fluid rather than a fixed frame for solving social problems, and disputing is seen as just that: a social problem.
The evolution of any dispute is a result of its cultural history and the
relations over time among a number of participants, only some of whom
may be in the courtroom. Remember that for a number of cases ... the
victim is never present in the hearing; family members may initiate cases
on behalf of relatives. [pp. 129-30]

Harmony as explicit ideology ("a permeating component of a political ideology, housed in the mind" (p. 9)) emerges most clearly in the
self-definition and role of municipal officials, and in court styles. Like
many traditional Meso-American and Andean communities, Talea (at
least through the 1950s) organized town government around what is
known as a system of cargos or duties. Municipal offices that fulfill
these cargos are occupied by influential men (principales) whose position in the local hierarchy is determined by a mix of age, education,
money, experience, and reputation for wisdom or honesty. Principales
4. That cases go so heavily against defendants speaks to the social and cultural embeddedness
of law in Talea de Castro. Unlike Western court procedures that exclude gossip or hearsay and
restrict evidence not presented by the parties and ruled admissible at trial, here
such informal evidence is not disregarded. The defendant is fully aware that the men rendering the decision know him or her well, as does the plaintiff. They know if he has been
"playing around," if he is addicted to drink, ifhe has assaulted his wife, or if he is in general
a problem citizen. They have a fairly good pre-hearing knowledge of her personal history
and may use it in her favor or to her disadvantage. Realizing that the judges know the full
history of the case, the defendant pleads guilty in nine out of ten cases, and the plaintiff only
brings a case that is winnable in these terms.
P. 155.
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nominate slates of candidates for each post, and local electors (all
men) vote at periodic town meetings. Service is obligatory and short
term (pp. 29-30). Three offices are critical here: the municipal presidente, the sindico, and the a/ca/de or mayor. The presidente considers petitions, resolves complaints, and administers justice. The sindico
oversees the police, investigates serious crimes, and serves as the village's official link to state government. The a/ca/de resolves any case
not dealt with by the other two. Each office has a separate court and
distinct procedures; the system also includes a jail and a small local
police force (pp. 30-33). Despite differences among these officials and
their courts, as a group all three stand in sharp contrast to the district
court, located in Villa Alta, a day's hard travel from the village.
The old conventional wisdom of anthropology painted cargo systems as age-graded hierarchies through which men rose to civil office
more or less as they rose in religious knowledge and ritual status. 5
Nader affirms this, despite acknowledging changes that enhance the
role of class, education, and ties to the world outside the village in the
determination of power and office holding (p. 32). She asserts that the
village responds to such pressures by affirming a corporate sense of
self. One example is a system of appeals from court to court within
the town that developed precisely to avoid the perils of going to the
outside. Thus, for Taleans, "village autonomy by means of increasingly self-reliant village courts has increased with the development of a
heterogeneous and stratified town population and the general rise in
social intercourse that accompanied market and commercial developments even before opening of the road" (p. 68). The result is contradictory: "A basically egalitarian hierarchical system is operating
within a changing pattern of stratification and is becoming more hierarchical and semi-exclusionary" (pp. 32-33).
The matter is important because it bears on the representativeness
of local officials, and on the degree to which they share local norms
and experiences as fully as the conventional portrait suggests. As class
and stratification replace age and symmetry, we may expect courts to
become less rather than more representative, and ties to the outside
(for example, commercial relations) to gain in importance. We may
also expect to find increasingly open expressions of dissent in the village. These will involve not just litigation on specific cases, but a more
general challenge to the authority of principales and officials. I return
to this issue below.
I mentioned earlier that local courts operate on a therapeutic imperative. Through skillful use of court transcripts, Nader shows how
the desire to "make a balance" and ensure lasting reconciliation drives
5. See, e.g., R. REINA, THE LAW OF THE SAINTS: A POKOMAM PUEBLO AND ITS COMMU·
NITY CULTURE (1966). For a useful review of the relevant literature, see R. W ASSERSTROM,
CLASS AND SOCIETY IN CENTRAL CHIAPAS (1983).
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the search for solutions. At a final hearing in one tangled case involving husband, pregnant wife, and mother-in-law, the presidente pleads:
Please try to calm down. Even as things stand, and with the gossip of
others, we can still come to an amicable settlement so that you can return to your home again. I am afraid I do not have the power to bring
about a separation. You would have to go to the head of the civil registry [in Villa Alta]. I am only in this office to settle litigations in the best
way possible, resolving these conflicts so that they may not occur again.
[p. 202]

In another case (adultery this time) the presidente said:
This is how things stand in this case. Senora Ana is responsible for what
happened to this man. Senor Antonio is responsible for having gone to
Senor Demetria's home in the middle of the night. I am here to resolve
this with an agreement. You will recognize your blame and will pay the
punishment. It can all be settled here. I will look for some means by
which you can return to your homes again. [p. 211]

One of the reasons conciliation and making a balance are powerful
goals is the belief that once disputes escalate beyond the town, local
control is lost. The village then becomes subject to the workings of the
district court and state government. This means unfamiliar rules,
bribes, costly procedures, and possible punishments for failure to keep
order at home. Once the case moves to the district court, there will be
little sensitivity to matters like balance or autonomy.
The overall validity of Nader's argument hinges on the adequacy
of her description of Talea de Castro as a self-contained, autonomous,
and self-managing entity. The matter has theoretical and empirical
dimensions. In theoretical terms, the portrait she paints relies on
residual functionalist arguments6 about the role of courts in the village
and the village in the larger system. Occasionally the system is depicted as in automatic balance, with everything finding a level and
form of expression that contributes to the health and maintenance of
the whole. The tautologies common to functionalist analysis surface
here, as in the assertion that "[a] case would enter the court system
and gradually gravitate to its proper place of resolution" (p. 93).
Local codes and ideologies about harmony as manifest in law are described as community accommodations to European conquest that lay
bases required for unity, solidarity, and survival (p. 132, 319-22). The
point is made at length in the conclusions, which present the TaleanZapotec pattern of law and belief about law as both a product of conquest, a hegemonic control system that entered Meso-America
· 6. Functionalism is difficult to define in a few words, but the following elements are present
in most working definitions: an emphasis on normative consensus as central to the construction
of order; specification of a set of basic needs or "functional requisites,'' which are then fulfilled by
given structures; and a general vision of societies as "social systems" in homeostatic balance,
tending to equilibrium. A useful introduction to debates about functionalism remains SYSTEM,
CHANGE, AND CONFLICT: A READER ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND THE
DEBATE OVER FUNCTIONALISM (N. Demerath & R. Peterson eds. 1967).
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through Spanish law and Catholic missions (p. 307), and a
counterhegemonic arrangement making survival and resistance
possible.
This may be so, and attention to the construction of
counterhegemonies out of the materials of domination certainly is important, not to mention fashionable in anthropology lately.7 But the
evidence Nader presents does not explain how these concepts apply (if
at all) to the case at hand. The introduction and conclusions stress
colonial history, missions, and the like, but substantive chapters provide almost no evidence on the years between conquest and the early
twentieth century. Detailed reconstruction of the encounter between
peripheral peoples and the power of colonial rule and its culture is
difficult, but scholars such as Smith, Wasserstrom, Fields, or
Comaroff 8 have done it in recent work. Data collected on the model
of the harmonious community cannot do the job.
A further problem affects Nader's analysis. Anthropological work
on Meso-American communities, cargo systems, and the general organization of power and ideology that is more recent than that on
which Nader relies casts considerable doubt on the empirical validity
of harmony as an organizing principle in the first place. 9 The emphasis on harmony and on the community as an autonomous, self-balancing unit seriously undervalues dimensions of conflict within the
community arising from property and class, and from long-term relations binding parts of the community to the larger system. Communities such as Talea de Castro are as much divided as united, and
definitely are more stratified than egalitarian. But despite acknowledging the growing power of class, Nader fails to incorporate it into
her analysis. This makes it difficult to set the operations and meaning
of law in a realistic context of conflicts over power, status, and
meaning.IO
7. For an overview, see Ortner, supra note 3. A powerful example of such work is J.
CoMAROFF, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF REsISTANCE (1985).
8. 1. CoMAROFF, supra note 7; K. FIELDS, REVIVAL AND REBELLION JN CoLONJAL CEN·
TRAL AFRICA (1985); R. WASSERSrROM, supra note 5; Comarolf & Comarolf, Christianity and
Colonialism in South Africa, 13 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 1 (1986); Smith, Local History in Global
Context: Social and Economic Transitions in Western Guatemala, 26 COMP. STUD. SocY. &
HIST. 193 (1984).
9. See, e.g.• D. BRINTNALL, REVOLT AGAINST THE DEAD (1979); R. FALLA, QUJCHfl.
REBELDE (1978).
10. A good example is the rising number of conversions to Protestantism described for the
entire region in D. MARTIN, TONGUES OF FIRE: THE EXPLOSION OF PROTESTANTISM JN LATIN
AMERICA (1990), or D. STOLL, Is LATIN AMERICA TuRNJNG PROTESTANT? (1990). These stir
opposition to traditional bases of hierarchy and authority, lead to questions about voluntary
public service, and shuffle longstanding alignments in part by creating new identities and links
with the outside. Conversions are not random, but accumulate along fault lines in the community, drawing those disadvantaged by the old cargo system. Nader touches on the impact of
conversion in Talea de Castro as part of a general discussion of "factionalism" (p. 179) but fails
to incorporate it into her analysis of law and social control.

May 1991]

Harmony, Law, and Anthropology

1775

That harmony and conflict are compatible is unexceptionable.
That opponents unite against the outside is common to many societies
and cultures: "[M]e against my brother, my brother and me against
the world." But the central issue is less harmony or conflict and their
expression in law than understanding the long-term forces that change
what harmony, conflict, and the like mean and where they are likely to
be sought. Nader depicts a system in dynamic equilibrium, controlling itself in order to shield the community as a whole from outside
pressures and the changes they may bring. In this view, change comes
primarily from reaction to the outside; the central orientation is
defensive.
An alternative perspective might paint cargo systems not as autonomous units enclosing and defending a static culture, but rather as
reflecting power differences within the village even as the village itself
appears as - and is - a weak and wholly subordinate cog in the
larger machine of political and cultural domination. From this angle,
the exercise of power within the village (often through law) rests on
the isolation these legal arrangements are intended to safeguard. This
suggests great potential for conflict and resistance within the village,
particularly as the control of local elites falters and alternatives appear
on the scene. New crops, transport, schools, conversions to Protestantism, organization of trade unions, and advocacy of political parties
are all part of a growing search for and appeals to outside allies to
counter the power of officials drawn, Nader acknowledges (p. 30),
from the local elite. Subordinate or dissatisfied groups (for example,
ambitious young men, disinherited second sons, and women) engage
the outside in innovative ways. From this perspective, village life and
culture are less reactive and more innovative than Nader allows for. 11
II. BUILDING BEITER THEORIES
Over the past few decades, anthropology (like the social sciences
generally) has witnessed significant and often highly contentious theoretical debates. At a minimum, these focus upon the following issues:
harmony versus conflict; the status of ideas, symbols, and material
structures in the making of culture; the relevance of class and national
and transnational networks to cultural systems once assumed to be
independent and self-sustaining; and the role of the analyst's own
presuppositions in shaping what is found "out there" and the sense
that is made of it. All these and more are on display in Harmony
Ideology, primarily in the concluding chapters.
Many of the difficulties this book presents arise from the author's
desire to acknowledge debate and change in her discipline and incorporate it into the analysis of Talea de Castro. The goal is laudable, but
11. See Smith, supra note 8.
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the result is more confusion than clarity. The author's apparent reluctance to part with any point of view compounds the problems created
by weak links between new perspectives and old data. Throughout the
book, theoretical change is treated as incremental. For example, Nader states correctly that earlier structural-functionalist concerns about
stability and boundedness have yielded to interest in change and in
linkages with larger systems. She explains:
Today, by virtue of the speed of social and cultural change, we are able
to better recognize the relationship between local cultures and external
social forces such as religious and political colonialism, an observation
that earlier functionalist studies with intemalist perspectives neglected.
This awareness forces us to reflect on grossly unequal power structures
that overlap in interesting ways, resulting at times in conciliatory legal
styles. [p. 315]

One is tempted to ask what the pace of change has to do with all
this. Earlier studies did not neglect these relationships. The truth is
that earlier generations of anthropologists marginalized such issues in
theoretical terms while working closely with the structures of religious
and political colonialism. This is why theoretical debates have been so
sharp. At issue is not just filling in a few gaps in our knowledge, now
that modem communications make us more aware, but rather reassessing the basic premises of earlier work. 12 Here lies the fatal flaw of
this book. It is not that the data are in themselves weak. As we have
seen, they are dense, rich, and often fascinating. But gathered and
interpreted for one purpose, they cannot support the theoretical edifice
Nader now wishes to construct.
Nader's conclusions are filled with analytical leaps that cannot be
sustained on the evidence of this book. A good example is the author's
statement that the uses of harmony in the village and its relation to the
values operating in district and state courts "have different meanings
for the villagers and for the village. At issue is not individualism versus community, for both concepts are known and valued by the mountain Zapotec. At issue are resistance and repression in the context of
religion and the political economy of the wider polity" (p. 306). This
may be so, and recent theoretical shifts will likely spur research to
document it. But on the evidence in Harmony Ideology, it is impossible to say one way or another.
To improve the analysis of law as linked with culture and power,
several points must be kept in mind. First, a more complete historical
context is essential. Reconstructing the historical record can shed new
light on how institutions (including legal institutions) came to stand
between individuals and their problems and on the encompassing
structures of power and meaning that drive everyday life into recognizable and limited channels. This suggests a second point, which is to
12. See K. FIELDS, supra note 8, for a devastating account in these terms.
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broaden the working definition of local life beyond the narrow bounds
of "my village" (so central to classical anthropology) to include regular links with larger structures. This is what ordinary people do;
scholars would be wise to follow their lead. Close analysis of such ties
(economic, cultural, political, personal, and institutional) will make it
possible to relate law to conflict and resistance in more systematic
ways. When this is done, it will become clear that these ties are no
one-way street. Local residents react to change but they do much
more. They also manipulate the system, reach out for allies, and experiment with new solutions.
·
Incorporating history, domination, and human agency into the picture in these ways makes it easier to grasp the connections of law not
only to the initiation and settlement of disputes, but also to the creation and legitimation of power and resistance. Legal norms and arrangements are at once symbols of a culture's key values and operators
for working within the system for which they stand. Law reflects
power while at the same time providing possibilities of access and opposition to it. That harmony and conflict coexist everywhere is clear.
What remains to be learned is how the two are fused in ways that
make sense not just of order, but also of change.

